1 The claimant challenges the rejection of his asylum application as inadmissible under section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG seeking the granting of international family protection under section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (3) first sentence of the Asylum Act (AsylG, Asylgesetz).

2 The claimant is, by his own account, a Somali national. He is the father of three children, born in 2006, 2007 and 2008.

3 In response to his application dating from December 2013, he was granted international protection in Italy. A further application for asylum, lodged in the federal territory in October 2015, was rejected by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, hereinafter Federal Office) as inadmissible based on section 27a AsylG, old version. The action brought against that rejection was successful. In August 2017, in view of the fact that the Federal Office had granted refugee status to his three children in June 2017, the claimant requested the granting of international family protection. By notice of 31 August 2017 the Federal Office again rejected the claimant's asylum application as inadmissible, this time on the basis of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG.

4 In response to the action brought by the claimant, the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) annulled the Federal Office's notice. The Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) dismissed the defendant's appeal on points of fact and law. Section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG did not apply because the claimant had a right under section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (3) AsylG. The provision in question pertained only to a foreign national's own right to be granted international protection, and not to a derived right to international family protection as well. Section 26 AsylG was intended to permit quick, consistent decisions, avoid administrative expenditure, and unburden administrative authorities as well as administrative courts. Moreover, the provision was intended to protect the family unity and promote integration. It particularly aimed for international protection to be granted in the same Member State, so that the fact that protection had been granted in another Member State was to be attributed only lesser weight. It could not be concluded from section 31 (4) AsylG that section 26 AsylG is not supposed to take precedence over section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG.

5 As grounds for its appeal on points of law, the defendant stated in essence that the fact that the legislature created a provision for a conflict of norms only for section 29 (1) no. 3 AsylG, but not for the other provisions on inadmissibility, indicates that section 26 AsylG is not to take precedence where those other provisions apply. Section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG took due account of the idea that a foreign national who has already obtained international protection in another EU Member State has no need of any further granting of protection. The purpose of family asylum of assisting all members of a refugee family to achieve rapid integration and uniform legal status could not be attributed sweeping priority over the core rationale of the Common European Asylum System, which is to prevent secondary movement. Applicants should not be able to question the decision on responsibility reached between the participating Member States, and to choose a Member State to grant protection by irregular movement (illegale Weiterwanderung). The criteria determining responsibility under articles 9 and 10 of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 would be circumvented if the person concerned, having already successfully completed one asylum procedure, could pursue another asylum procedure in the desired Member State where his or her family members have taken up residence. In interpreting the relationship between section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG and section 26 AsylG, the idea of procedural simplification adduced for the application of family asylum is of no importance, because the effort to be expended to examine the requirements for the application of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG is in no regard greater, but rather is regularly less, than is involved in an examination under section 26 AsylG.

6 The claimant defends the judgment on the appeal on points of fact and law.

7 The Representative of the Interests of the Federation at the Federal Administrative Court (Vertreter des Bundesinteresses beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht) declared not to take part in the proceedings.

8 With the consent of the parties, the Senate decides on the defendant's appeal on points of law on the basis of an oral hearing conducted in conformity with section 102a of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung).

9 1. As provided in section 141 first sentence, section 125 (1) first sentence, and section 92 (3) first sentence VwGO, the proceedings on the appeal on points of law are to be discontinued to the extent that the defendant has withdrawn its appeal as provided in section 140 (1) first sentence VwGO.

10 2. With regard to all other aspects, the defendant's appeal on points of law is without merit. The rejection of the asylum application as inadmissible is unlawful and violates the claimant's rights (section 113 (1) first sentence VwGO). The Higher Administrative Court's legal view complies with federal law (section 137 (1) no. 1 VwGO) in holding that the provision on inadmissibility concerning the granting of international protection by another EU Member State was not applicable because the claimant has a right to international family protection.

11 The legal assessment of the claimant's request is governed by the Asylum Act (AsylG) in the version promulgated on 2 September 2008 (Federal Law Gazette (BGBl., Bundesgesetzblatt) I p. 1798), last amended by article 165 of the Eleventh Competence Adjustment Ordinance (Elfte Zuständigkeitsanpassungsverordnung) of 19 June 2020 (BGBl. I p. 1328), which went into force on 27 June 2020. Changes in the law occurring after the last oral hearing or the decision of the court responsible for finding the facts must be taken into consideration if they had to be considered by the court responsible for finding the facts - if it were to decide instead of the court deciding on appeals on points of law (Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG, Bundesverwaltungsgericht), judgment of 11 September 2007 - 10 C 8.07 - Rulings of the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwGE, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts), 129, 251 para. 19). Since the present case concerns a dispute under asylum law where the court responsible for finding the facts regularly had to refer to the factual and legal situation at the time of the last oral hearing or the decision pursuant to section 77 (1) AsylG, it would have to base a decision on the current legal situation if it were to decide on the matter now, unless a derogation is required for reasons of substantive law (established jurisprudence, see BVerwG, judgment of 20 February 2013 - 10 C 23.12 - BVerwGE 146, 67 para. 12). The provisions, that are decisive here, have not changed, however, since the decision of the Higher Administrative Court.

12 The inadmissibility of an asylum application if another EU Member State has already granted protection (section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG) bars any (new) granting of protection "by one's own right" on grounds of threats to the foreign national in the country of origin itself (a), but does not hinder granting international family protection under section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG, where that protection is derived from a family member who is entitled to protection (b). It is not disputed between the parties that the claimant meets the written requirements for the granting of family refugee protection under both section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG and section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (3) first sentence 1 AsylG.

13 a) A foreign national who, like the claimant in the present case, has already been granted international protection in another EU Member State is normally not once more to be granted international protection, founded on a well-founded fear of persecution or the risk of suffering serious harm, upon moving further into the federal territory.

14 According to section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG, an application for asylum within the meaning of section 13 (1) AsylG is inadmissible if another EU Member State has already granted the foreign national international protection within the meaning of section 1 (1) no. 2 AsylG. That rule transposes into national law article 33 (1) and (2) (a) of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (OJ L 180 p. 60) (hereinafter Directive 2013/32/EU). According to that provision, Member States may consider an application for international protection as inadmissible if another Member State has granted international protection. The provision is intended to exclude the granting of protection status under asylum law in multiple EU Member States and to prevent or limit undesirable secondary movement.

15 Under section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG, the new examination and granting of international protection in the case of a request for protection against persecution, deportation, or some other form of return to another country is normally precluded if the foreign national has already been granted international protection in another Member State on grounds of impending persecution or other threats to himself or herself. In such a constellation, the beneficiary of protection must regularly rely on the granting of protection by the granting EU Member State.

16 This is not the case where the living conditions, which would await the beneficiary of protection as a recognised refugee in the other Member State, would expose him or her to a serious risk of suffering inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) (Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), judgment of 19 March 2019 - C-297/17, C-318/17, C-319/17 and C-438/17 [ECLI:EU:C:2019:296], Ibrahim et al. - para. 101 and decision of 13 November 2019 - C-540/17 and C-541/17 [ECLI:EU:C:2019:964], Hamed and Omar - para. 34 et seqq.; see also BVerwG, judgments of 20 May 2020 - 1 C 34.19 - (...) para. 17 and 19 and of 17 June 2020 - 1 C 35.19 - (...) para. 23 et seqq. and 27). There are no factual findings on this at hand.

17 b) The granting of international protection by another EU Member State does not, however, prevent the granting of international family protection derived from a family member entitled to protection, because section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG does not apply to section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG (...). This understanding of the norm is the result of an interpretation of both provisions (aa). It is not opposed by any express legal provision on conflict of norms (bb). It is furthermore consistent with article 3 of Directive 2011/95/EU (cc).

18 aa) While the wording (1) and systematic connection (2) of the legislation yield no unequivocal conclusions about the relationship between the two norms, an interpretation based on historical genesis (3) and teleology (4) argues against the application of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG to section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG.

19 (1) A grammatical interpretation of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG and of section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG does not yield an unequivocal conclusion as to any relationship of precedence between the two norms.

20 Nor does any comprehensive precedence of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG proceed from the fact that section 29 (1) AsylG governs the inadmissibility of an "asylum application", and by the standards of both natural and normative usage, the term of an asylum application is capable of including the granting of international family protection However, concerning the scope of application of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG, it must be borne in mind that the term of an asylum application as shaped by EU law takes no account of the national legal institution of international family protection.

21 (2) Nor does the systematic connection offer any clear picture.

22 At most, the fact that section 29 (1) AsylG governs the inadmissibility of an "asylum application", without differentiating whether the application is based on impending threats to the applicant in the country of origin, or on the protection status of the principal person entitled (Stammberechtigter), might argue for an applicability of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG to section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG. The term "asylum application" is linked to section 13 (1) AsylG. According to that provision, an asylum application shall be deemed to have been made if it is clear from the foreign national's written, oral or otherwise expressed desire that he or she is seeking protection in the federal territory from political persecution or that he or she wishes protection from deportation or some other form of return to a country where he or she would be subject to the persecution defined in section 3 (1) AsylG or serious harm as defined in section 4 (1) AsylG. In national law, a request for the granting of international family protection is considered, so to speak, as being automatically included in filing an asylum application, without the need for a separate application (see, in this connection, BVerwG, judgment of 25 June 1991 - 9 C 48.91 - BVerwGE 88, 326 <328>). Here, however, it holds true that section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG relates to the international protection granted in another Member State, and when that protection was granted, certainly no decision at all was made on the availability of national family protection, as this is offered only under the national laws of the Federal Republic of Germany.

23 (3) By contrast to the above, an interpretation of section 26 AsylG on the basis of historical genesis does offer a weighty argument against the application of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG to section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG; such an interpretation indicates that the members of the (nuclear) family of a beneficiary of protection were supposed to be enabled to re-establish the family unit on the basis of a uniform protection status, while it does not indicate that to this extent, there was supposed to be a differentiation between family members who had no protection, and those who had already been granted international protection in another state.

24 In the Federal Republic of Germany, the foundations of the institution of family asylum were laid by judge-made law. Originally there was no legal provision that extended the asylum status of principal person entitled to that person's spouse and children (BVerwG, judgment of 29 April 1971 - 1 C 42.67 - BVerwGE 38, 87 <88>). In the practice of the authorities granting recognition and the administrative courts, to some extent also dependants of a refugee, especially his wife and dependent minor children, were granted the same status as the foreign refugee himself, on the basis of the concept of family protection, which was becoming established in national and international law, and of the experience that those who are dependent on a refugee in many cases were likewise exposed to persecution, or at least severe disadvantages, in the country of persecution, especially if a totalitarian system prevailed in that country (BVerwG, judgment of 1 June 1965 - 1 C 5.62 - (...)). Political persecution of individual family members is often characterised by the spreading indirect effects of the measure of persecution, and by the reason for persecution, which often extends to all family members. In virtue of their mutual dependence, the measure of persecution very often interferes with the family members' personal and economic relationships. Such an indirect effect of a measure of persecution aimed at someone else may become a measure of persecution against the affected third party as well (BVerwG, judgment of 27 April 1982 - 9 C 239.80 - BVerwGE 65, 244 <249 et seq.>). In the prognostic assessment of the persecution threatening the spouse or minor children of a person subjected to political persecution, a general presumption was adopted to the effect that wherever cases are found in which a state has engaged in reprisals against the wife or (minor) children in connection with the political persecution of their husband or father, there is a considerable probability that the wife or children whose right to asylum must be decided in that specific case are also threatened with the same fate (BVerwG, judgment of 2 July 1985 - 9 C 35.84 - (...)).

25 Through article 3 of the Act on the Reorganisation of the Law on Foreign Nationals (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Ausländerrechts) of 9 July 1990 (BGBl. I p. 1354), for the first time the legislature established a legal basis for family asylum, under section 7a (3) of the Asylum Procedure Act (AsylVfG, Asylverfahrensgesetz), old version. The provision was intended to "take the pressure off the Federal Office for recognising foreign refugees, and off the administrative courts, because it provide(d) for the possibility of abstaining from what might have been a difficult examination of the separate reasons for persecution of the family members of a person entitled to asylum". The provision was furthermore considered "socially justified" because it encouraged the "integration of close family members of persons subject to political persecution received in the Federal Republic of Germany as persons entitled to asylum" (Bundestag Printed Paper (BT-Drs., Bundestagsdrucksache) 11/6960 p. 29 et seq.). The legislature adhered to this concept of family asylum based on the legal presumption of persecution when it recast the Asylum Procedure Act, in article 1 of the Act on the Reorganisation of Asylum Procedure (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Asylverfahrens) of 26 June 1992 (BGBl. I p. 1126), and created section 26 AsylVfG (BT-Drs. 12/2718 p. 60). By granting family protection against deportation for the close family members of refugees who had been recognised (only) under section 60 (1) of the Residence Act (AufenthG, Aufenthaltsgesetz), in article 3 no. 17 (d) of the Act to Control and Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and Foreign Nationals (Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern) - Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) - of 30 July 2004 (BGBl. I p. 1950), the legislature reinforced the concept of family unity, which was anchored in article 6 (1) of the Basic Law (GG, Grundgesetz) and inherent in international refugee protection, and took due account of the interest in having a uniform legal status within a family (BT-Drs. 15/420 p. 109; see also Bundesrat printed paper (BR-Drs., Bundesratsdrucksache) 22/03 p. 260 et seq.).

26 The recast version of section 26 AsylG by article 1 of the Act Transposing Directive 2011/95/EU (Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2011/95/EU) of 28 August 2013 (BGBl. I p. 3474) served to transpose article 23 (2) of that Directive into national law. In addition to the forms of protection of family asylum and family refugee protection established by national law, a common status for the case of those entitled to subsidiary protection and their family members was introduced. This was supposed to facilitate the application of the law, and also to take due account of the fact that family members are often exposed to a threat situation comparable to that of the principal person entitled (BT-Drs. 17/13063 p. 21). Section 26 (5) first and second sentences in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG aimed to confer the same rights on the family members of a beneficiary of protection as the principal person entitled had, for the purpose of preserving the family unit and maintaining protection of minors. To achieve this goal, the legislature did not take the path of a transposition in terms of residence law and social law alone; instead, it decided, not least of all in the interest of procedural simplification, to implement the requirements of article 23 (2) of Directive 2011/95/EU in terms of asylum law reaching further than EU law required (BT-Drs. 17/13063 p. 21).

27 It would not be compatible with this legislative concept if the group of family members protected under section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG were to be limited, by applying section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG, solely to those who had not yet been granted protection in another EU Member State. The legislative materials offer no reason to believe that the form chosen for transposing the requirements of article 23 (2) in conjunction with article 2 (j) of Directive 2011/95/EU is not supposed to apply to the case group of further beneficiaries of international protection - as are under consideration here - even though an obligation to transpose also exists in their regard; nor do the materials suggest that the legislature intended to relegate this group of persons to a transposition exclusively in terms of residence law. That any such relegation was intended is all the less likely in as much as the existing regulations of the Residence Act for subsequent immigration of family members probably do not cover all the cases that EU law embraces for preserving the family unity living in the host Member State.

28 (4) A teleological interpretation of section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG reinforces the understanding of the norm derived from its historical genesis (a). Spirit and purpose of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG do not require any different view (b).

29 (a) Besides simplifying procedure and relieving the Federal Office and the administrative courts of the sometimes difficult and protracted examination of the impending threats to the family member himself or herself, international family protection under section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG is to a significant degree intended to serve to preserve family unity.

30 This purpose comes likewise to apply to family members who have already been granted international protection in another Member State, and who cannot be returned to their country of origin because they are subject to impending threats, and regularly also cannot be returned to the other Member State because of their family ties established within the federal territory. At any event, in view of the historical genesis of section 26 AsylG it is not evident that the legislature intended to withhold equivalent legal status from such family members, and thus impede them from effectively asserting rights derived from international family protection, in disregard of the fact that as a rule these persons will lawfully take up an intended long-term residence in the federal territory, so that the goal of limiting a secondary movement of persons who have already received international protection in another Member State cannot (or can no longer) be achieved. One factor firmly arguing against such an assumption is that for this group of persons, the legislature saw no need to provide otherwise regarding the transposition of article 23 (2) of Directive 2011/95/EU.

31 (b) Spirit and purpose of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG do not require any different understanding of the norm.

32 The norm transposing article 33 (1) and (2) (a) of Directive 2013/32/EU into national law is intended to avoid ineffective duplicate examinations and diverging decisions by authorities and courts. It is substantially founded on the Common European Asylum System's core rationale of limiting irregular secondary movement between Member States by persons who have applied for international protection (see, e.g., recital 13 of Directive 2011/95/EU; also CJEU, judgment of 17 March 2016 - C-695/15 [ECLI:EU:C:2016:188], Mirza - para. 52; BVerwG, decision to request a preliminary ruling of 27 April 2016 - 1 C 22.15 - (...) para. 26). Neither those seeking protection nor the beneficiaries of protection are supposed to be offered an incentive to move further to another Member State, so as to seek once again the granting of international protection there against the impending threats in their country of origin.

33 However, if - for whatever reason - members of a nuclear family (parents and their minor children) have received international protection in different Member States, the primary purpose of section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG - to prevent secondary movement - does not oppose a derived protection status. In such a case, a shared family life can, by its very nature, be achieved only in a single Member State. Thus the restoration of family unity in a Member State that has granted international protection to one family member does not result in a secondary movement that is undesirable under EU law and would have to be prevented by the return to another Member State. Another argument against the presumption of a secondary movement that is undesirable under EU law is offered by the family-related criteria for determining responsibility set out in articles 8 to 10 of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, which have to be applied primarily when determining the Member State responsible and which are precisely intended to help protect the best interest of the child and the family unity (CJEU, judgment of 2 April 2019 - C-582/17 and C- 583/17 [ECLI:EU:C:2019:280], - para. 83; see also recitals 13, 14 and 16 and article 6 (3) (a) and articles 11, 16 and 17 (2) of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013). In cases where these options for family reunification have not already been exercised during the asylum procedure - for whatever reason - and thus members of a family have received international protection in different Member States, if family reunification in the federal territory were possible only at the level of the law on residence titles, the family member who benefits from protection in another Member State would have to refrain from, in the federal territory, the protection status that had been granted to him or her in virtue of the impending threats to himself or herself. The legislative materials do not reveal any such intent of the national legislature. EU law, particularly article 23 et seqq. of Directive 2011/95/EU, also contains no indication that the rights of family members linked to the granting of protection exist only in the Member State where the first application was filed or protection was granted.

34 Moreover, applying section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG to section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG would unavoidably result in conflicts of assessments. Family members who were granted international protection in another EU Member State due to the impending threats to them in their country of origin would be disadvantaged, with respect to the granting of international family protection and the associated benefits in the federal territory, in comparison to family members whose application for asylum in another Member State had been unsuccessful. It would also disadvantage minor children who have been granted international protection in another Member State, in comparison to children born later in the federal territory. In light of the right to respect for family life (article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR)), such unequal treatment would not be justifiable on grounds that a foreign national entitled to protection in another Member State needs no protection in Germany, since as a rule, he or she cannot effectively avail himself or herself of such rights without abandoning his or her restored family unity.

35 bb) The Asylum Act furthermore includes no provision on conflicts of norms that expressly governs the relationship between section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG and section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG. There is no possibility of recourse to section 31 (4) AsylG, according to which section 26 (5) AsylG shall be unaffected in the cases under section 26 (1) to (4) AsylG in the event that the asylum application is rejected as inadmissible under section 26a AsylG.

36 Section 31 (4) AsylG precludes the application of section 29 (1) no. 3 AsylG to a right to family refugee protection under section 26 (5) in conjunction with (1) to (4) AsylG. The provision is directly factually connected with section 29 (1) no. 3 AsylG. This is because, at least since the insertion of this provision, an application for asylum with regard to a safe third country can no longer be rejected "only pursuant to section 26a AsylG", but only by way of an inadmissibility decision under section 29 (1) no. 3 (in conjunction with section 26a) AsylG, with due regard for the requirements stipulated therein (see, in more detail, BVerwG, judgment of 21 April 2020 - 1 C 4.19 - (...) para. 16).

37 In the course of the fundamental revision of section 29 (1) AsylG by article 6 no. 7 of the Integration Act (Integrationsgesetz) of 31 July 2016 (BGBl. I p. 1939), the legislature limited itself to merely deleting the provision of section 31 (4) first sentence AsylG in the version in force until 5 August 2016 - which was no longer needed - and merely "adjusting" section 31 (4) second sentence 2 AsylG, old version; neither then nor subsequently did the legislature add further provisions on conflicts of norms to this regulation, which by express intent refers to section 29 (1) no. 3 AsylG (BR-Drs. 266/16 p. 53). This fact indicates that the regulatory content of section 31 (4) AsylG does not extend to the other provisions on inadmissibility. Nor can any direct conclusions as to constellations not covered by the express wording be drawn from the legislature's original intent, limited to cases under section 26a AsylG, to "clarify" by way of section 31 (4) AsylG that if family members are not entitled to asylum on their own because they entered the country from a safe third country, they are precluded from invoking derived rights under section 26 AsylG (BT-Drs. 15/420 p. 110; see, in this connection, also BVerwG, judgment of 6 May 1997 - 9 C 56.96 - BVerwGE 104, 347 <348 et seqq.>).

38 In the light of this understanding of the norm, ultimately there is no room for the presumption, by an argument e contrario, that section 26 (5) first and second sentence in conjunction with (1) to (3) AsylG shall not be unaffected in cases of an inadmissibility under section 29 (1) no. 2 AsylG; nor can one argue for an application by analogy of section 31 (4) AsylG.

39 cc) Granting favoured status to a family member already granted protection in another EU Member State is also consistent with article 3 of Directive 2011/95/EU.

40 According to that article, Member States may introduce or retain more favourable standards for determining who qualifies as a refugee, and for determining the content of international protection, in so far as those standards are compatible with the Directive. A more favourable standard is compatible with Directive 2011/95/EU if it is not contrary to the general scheme and objectives of the Directive National provisions which allow for the granting of refugee status to third country nationals or stateless persons in situations which have no connection with the purpose of international protection are, in contrast, not compatible (CJEU, judgment of 18 December 2014 - C-542/13 [ECLI:EU:C:2014:2452], M'Bodj - para. 44). Where family members of a recognised refugee do not fall within the scope of a ground for exclusion laid down in article 12 of Directive 2011/95/EU and their situation is, due to the need to maintain family unity, consistent with the purpose of international protection, article 3 of Directive 2011/95/EU permits a Member State to extend that protection to other family members (CJEU, judgment of 4 October 2018 - C-652/16 [ECLI:EU:C:2018:801], Ahmedbekova and Ahmedbekov - para. 74).

41 The situation of a family member entitled to protection in another EU Member State who seeks international family protection cannot - due to the interest worthy of protection of restoring family unity - regularly be denied a connection with the rationale of international protection; nor can that connection be denied here.

42 3. The decision on costs is founded on sections 154 (2) and 155 (2) VwGO. According to section 83b AsylG no court costs will be charged. The value of the matter proceeds from section 30 of the Act on the Remuneration of Attorneys (RVG, Rechtsanwaltsvergütungsgesetz). There are no reasons for a derogation under section 30 (2) RVG.