The parties argue about the legal identification obligation existing for police officers in the defendant federal state of Brandenburg.

The claimant is employed by the defendant federal state as police sergeant (Polizeihauptmeister). He is deployed in the shift-based guard duty and sometimes also in a separate unit of the police of the federal state of Brandenburg. In the spring of 2013, the claimant applied to police headquarters for an exemption from the obligation of wearing a name tag and identification when being deployed in a separate unit. Police headquarters rejected the objection (Widerspruch) against the rejecting notice. The constitutional complaint filed with the Constitutional Court of the federal state of Brandenburg directly against the legal provision was dismissed as inadmissible on the grounds that it was still lacking an act of execution by an authority, which the claimant could challenge.

The action for a declaratory judgment stating that the claimant is not obliged to wear a name tag while performing official acts and is not obliged to wear identification on his uniform that allows his identity to be determined subsequently in the case of separate unit operations, was unsuccessful before the administrative courts, most recently before the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG, Bundesverwaltungsgericht).

7 The claimant's appeal on points of law is without merit; it must be dismissed in accordance with section 144 (2) and (4) of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung).

8 With regard to the obligation of the claimant to wear a name tag under section 9 (2) first sentence of the Police Act of the Federal State of Brandenburg (BbgPolG, Brandenburgisches Polizeigesetz) in the version of the Seventh Act to Amend the Police Act of the Federal State of Brandenburg of 9 June 2011 (Law and Ordinance Gazette (GVBl., Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt) I no. 10), the judgment of the Higher Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht) does not violate law that is subject to an appeal on points of law (section 137 (1) and section 191 (2) VwGO, section 127 no. 2 of the Civil Servants Framework Act (BRRG, Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz), as well as section 63 (3) second sentence of the Act on the Status of Civil Servants (BeamtStG, Beamtenstatusgesetz). Section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG is constitutional (1.)

9 Since the claimant is also occasionally deployed in a separate unit of the police, he is obliged under section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG to wear an identification that allows his identity to be determined subsequently. The assumption of the appeal judgment that this obligation imposed on the claimant directly by law does not interfere with his right to informational self-determination is a violation of law that is subject to an appeal of points of law. However, the decision proves to be correct for other reasons (section 144 (4) VwGO). Even though section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG interferes with the aforementioned right of the claimant, this interference is permissible under constitutional law (2.).

10 The questions raised in the course of the appeal on points of law as to whether the violation of the identification obligation by the acting police officer leads to the measure being unlawful or what other consequences this has, are irrelevant to the question of the permissibility under constitutional law of the legal provisions which is relevant for the decision here.

11 1. According to section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG, police officers wear a name tag on their uniform during official acts. This obligation is constitutional.

12 Only the actual surname has to be stated on the name tag and not the first name or initial letter of the first name as well. The main purpose of the obligation to wear a name tag is to make the work of the police more transparent and publicly accessible, since a public official appears who can be addressed by his or her surname from the outset and not just after the citizen concerned requests verification of identity (section 9 (1) BbgPolG). This purpose does not require the first name of the officer to be indicated as well. The draft act initiating the legislative procedure (Brandenburg Parliament (Landtag), printed paper 5/1442) suggests that only the surname has to be attached to the name tag. This limitation to the surname is also reflected in no. 4.4.2 and 4.5.2 of the Administrative Regulation of the Ministry of the Interior of 21 November 2012 (Official Gazette (Abl., Amtsblatt) p. 1956) in the version of 7 November 2018 (Abl. p. 1187), referred to as Administrative Regulation Identification Obligation (VV Kennzeichnungspflicht), issued based on section 9 (4) BbgPolG. Furthermore, contrary to the original draft act (Brandenburg Parliament, printed paper 5/1442), the Act does not provide for the rank to be stated on the name tags of the police officers. This shows the intention of the legislature to minimise the adverse effects for the officers, which are associated with the obligation to disclose their name in form of the surname, as much as possible.

13 The legislative power of the defendant federal state to order uniformed police officers to wear a tag with their surname during official acts results from its authority to regulate the appearance of uniformed police officers and additionally from its authority to regulate police law.

14 The provision of section 9 (2) first sentence BbGPolG interferes with the claimant's general right of personality in the form of the right to informational self-determination as guaranteed by article 2 (1) in conjunction with article 1 (1) of the Basic Law (GG, Grundgesetz) (a). The provision complies with the constitutional reservation in the Basic Law to restrict a basic right by a statue (Gesetzesvorbehalt) since the legislature of the federal state of Brandenburg - unlike other federal states that insufficiently base the identification obligation on an administrative regulation - made the key decisions itself. In particular, section 9 (4) BbgPolG does not entitle the authority authorised by the Act to create further exceptions comparable to the provision of section 9 (3) BbgPolG. The provision is also proportionate (c). Furthermore, section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG does not violate the principle of equal treatment (d) nor the duty of care (Fürsorgepflicht) (e).

15 a) The general right of personality also encompasses the authority of the individual to decide in principle independently when and within what limits real world personal fact situations may be revealed (Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG, Bundesverfassungsgericht), judgment of 24 November 2010 - 1 BvF 2/05 - Rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts) 128, 1 <42>). The protection of the right to informational self-determination derived from article 2 (1) in conjunction with article 1 (1) GG encompasses all information that could say something about the person to which they relate and therefore also basic data such as names and address (see BVerfG, judgment of 19 September 2018 - 2 BvF 1/15 - (...) para. 219 with further references, referring to the judgment of 15 December 1983 - 1 BvR 209/83 et al. - BVerfGE 65, 1 <45>). Regardless of the fact that the legal obligation affects him precisely in his capacity as a police officer, the claimant may invoke this right vis-à-vis his employer since the basic rights apply to civil servants within the framework of the service relationship in the same, and not to a lesser, extent (BVerfG, decision of 21 April 2015 - 2 BvR 1322, 1989/12 - BVerfGE 139, 19 para. 57).

16 Insofar as section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG obliges police officers of the federal state of Brandenburg to wear a name tag on their uniform when performing official acts, this interferes with their right to informational self-determination since the Act obliges the officer to disclose, unprompted, his or her actual surname - and not merely, for instance, an alias - to any citizen whom the officer confronts in his or her official capacity.

17 b) The right to informational self-determination is not granted without limitations. Apart from the inviolable core area of private life, the right may be limited based on an act, provided that this in the overriding public interest, the requirements and the scope of the limitations are evident from the act in a manner that is clear and recognisable for the citizen, and the principle of proportionality is ensured (BVerfG, judgment of 19 September 2018 - 2 BvF 1/15 - (...) para. 220 with further references). The more strongly the measure interferes with the privacy of the person concerned and the more it ignores justified confidentiality considerations, the higher the requirements are concerning the specificity of the legal provision; what is important is the relevance of the data to the personality, the openness or secrecy of the measure, and its range (BVerfG, judgment of 11 March 2008 - 1 BvR 2074/05 - BVerfGE 120, 378 <402>).

18 The principle of the rule of law as well as the requirement of democracy oblige the legislature to essentially regulate the provisions that are relevant in order to put the basic right into effect itself and not to leave these to the executive power to do and decide on. Such provisions are material if they are of considerable importance in order to put basic rights into effect. Under the Basic Law, the restriction of freedoms guaranteed by basic rights such as, in this case, the right to informational self-determination, through the obligation to disclose the family name without the need for any specific reason, is reserved to parliament. This ensures that decisions of such repercussions result from a procedure that gives the public the opportunity to develop and express its opinions, and that requires parliament to clarify the necessity and extent of encroachments upon basic rights in public debate (BVerfG, judgment of 24 September 2003 - 2 BvR 1436/02 - BVerfGE 108, 282 <311 et seq.> and decision of 21 April 2015 - 2 BvR 1322, 1989/12 - BVerfGE 139, 19 par. 52 et seq.).

19 aa) The legal provision of section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG meets these requirements. The legislature of the federal state of Brandenburg has itself decided the politically controversial question of the obligation of police officers to indicate their surname on their uniform without the need for any specific reasons. Previously, the responsible Committee for Internal Affairs of the Brandenburg Parliament had a public hearing, giving authorities, organisations as well as interest groups the opportunity to comment on the draft act (Brandenburg Parliament, printed paper 5/3175). Even the legislature made a distinction in section 9 (2) BbgPolG between regular deployments of police officers in uniform and deployments in separate units where the officer only has to wear an identification that allows him or her to be subsequently identified. In order to protect the personality rights of the officer in these cases, identification of the person concerned is only possible with the help of the employer who assigned the identification.

20 bb) The exception in section 9 (3) BbgPolG, which refers only to the name tag under section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG in the context relevant here, meets the requirement of legal clarity. According to this provision, identification by name does not apply provided that the purpose of the measure or official act, or the overriding interests of the police officer that warrant protection are impaired as a result.

21 The adverse effects on the right of informational self-determination generally associated with identifying the police officer by his or her name cannot be sufficient for this exception. The exception shall only apply if there are indications of adverse effects on the sphere of the officer that go above and beyond the regular disadvantages and that are additionally so important that the public interest in identifying police officers by name stated by the legislature has to take second place. This applies in particular to cases where facts or circumstances justify the assumption that by using the surname data concerning the officer that are not related to his or her duties - including information about his or her family - is to be obtained and that it is to be expected that such data will be misused for purposes not related to the office. In addition, an exception to identification by name comes into question in the case of overriding official interests.

22 In principle, the fact that the legislature uses indefinite legal terms (unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe) in section 9 (3) BbgPolG that require interpretation and specification is unobjectionable under constitutional law (see BVerfG, decision of 23 April 1974 - 1 BvR 6/74, 2270/73 - BVerfGE 37, 132 <142>). In view of the variety of possible constellations (see BVerfG, decision of 15 April 1970 - 2 BvR 396/69 - BVerfGE 28, 175 <183>) where priority must be given to the interests of the police officer, the legislature cannot be required to formulate a more detailed regulation. The prognosis-based decision required under section 9 (3) BbgPolG is typical especially in the field of police law and the prevention of threats. The legal provisions that are relevant for this, such as in particular the general clause under police law according to sections 1 and 10 BbgPolG, are no more detailed than section 9 (1) BbgPolG.

23 cc) The provision of section 9 (4) BbgPolG, according to which the member of the Land Government responsible for internal affairs regulates the content, scope and exceptions from the obligations under section 9 (2) BbgPolG by means of an administrative regulation, is unobjectionable with regard to the requirement of legal clarity.

24 Section 9 (4) BbgPolG cannot be interpreted in such a way that the responsible ministry would be entitled to establish additional exceptions of the same importance as the provision in subsection 3 since the legislature must itself take the decisions that are material for the right to informational self-determination. The exception provision in section 9 (3) BbgPolG is accordingly conclusive. Above and beyond that, the Administrative Regulation also has to adhere to the limits defined by the legislature. In fact, the authorisation under section 9 (4) BbgPolG has also been used this way - without this being of any importance.

25 No. 4.3 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht repeats the wording of section 9 (3) BbgPolG and merely explains the exception. No. 4.2 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht does name groups of officers that are exempt from the identification obligation. However, these exceptions can be immediately derived directly from the purpose of section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG or from the wording of the legal provision. Firstly, groups of police officers who do not have any direct contact with citizens due to their specific deployment or who do not wear any uniform are exempt (e.g. no. 4.2 (a), (b) and (e) to (g) VV Kennzeichnungspflicht). Secondly, such police officers are exempt where the purpose of the measure or official act requires an exception from identification by name based on section 9 (3) BbgPolG. This applies to officers while they are being deployed to protect people or to members of special police units whose identity is not to be compromised (no. 4.2 (c) and (d) VV Kennzeichnungspflicht).

26 c) In view of the public interests that are meant to be protected by the legal provision, the obligation to wear a tag with the surname under section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG is proportionate.

27 The original draft act (Brandenburg Parliament, printed paper 5/1442) sees the purpose of the Act, firstly, as maintaining and strengthening the transparency and public accessibility of the work of the police. When the state no longer acted anonymously when dealing with the citizen but through office holders who are identified by name, this strengthened the trust in the work of the police. Secondly, identification by name makes it easier to prosecute and investigate criminal offences or not inconsiderable breaches of official duties committed by police officers and thereby prevents them.

28 The Senate does not ignore the fact that the obligation to disclose the family name without the need for any specific reasons does have an adverse effect for the uniformed police officer since the name becomes known to a wider audience at the place where the operations are conducted. Nor can it be ruled out that pictures of the operation and the conduct of the officers acting there will be published online. However, it must be taken into consideration that the family name is not information from the officer's narrow sphere of private life. In addition, the officers are aware that the name will become known to the contact person as well as other persons. Furthermore, the officers are aware that disclosure of the family name is related to their service and generally affords an opportunity to the competent public authorities to institute investigations against them under criminal or disciplinary law.

29 Even though there is the possibility of a police officer being subjected to accusations or becoming the victim of an assault for no reason due to the obligation under section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG, currently available studies, however, show that this fear has not yet been confirmed, according to the factual findings of the Higher Administrative Court which are binding under section 137 (2) VwGO. There is no increase in the number of attacks against police officers nor can it be determined that the number of arbitrary and unjustified criminal complaints against police officers has increased. Furthermore the police officer may apply to have a block on releasing information entered in the population register (section 51 of the Federal Act on Registration (BMG, Bundesmeldegesetz)) and may also apply for a block on transmitting information in the vehicle registers (section 41 of the Road Traffic Act (StVG, Straßenverkehrsgesetz)), in order to make it even more difficult to obtain additional information about his or her person above and beyond the barriers to the granting of information that exist anyway.

30 Section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG serves legitimate purposes by strengthening the transparency of the work of the police and by facilitating the investigation of illegal conduct of police officers under criminal and disciplinary law. Easier detection of attacks by police officers strengthens compliance of the administration with existing legislation and prevents such breaches. Prevention, prosecution and investigation of criminal offences serve to put the rule of law into practice and are therefore extremely important. This is particularly true in the case of criminal offences committed by police officers while on duty. If an office holder commits a criminal offence while performing an official duty, this undermines trust in the integrity of public action. This is why there must be avoidance of even the appearance that acts of office holders are investigated less effectively or that the requirements for bringing a charge against such person are higher (BVerfG, chamber ruling of 23 March 2015 - 2 BvR 1304/12 - (...) para. 16 with further references).

31 The obligation to wear a name tag, which allows for the purpose of the Act to be achieved, is also necessary. A similarly suitable means that has fewer adverse effects for the police officer and therefore is less severe, is not evident. This is particularly true for the version discussed in the course of the oral hearing of the appeal on points of law, where the employer opened up the choice for the officer to use a name tag or several permanently allocated codes, since it is more difficult to achieve the public interest, duly pursued by the legislature with the identification obligation, in strengthening the public accessibility of the work of the police by allowing an officer to be addressed with his or her surname from the outset with this model, which also lets simple codes suffice when on regular duty, than with the provision within the meaning of section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG.

32 The obligation to wear a tag with the family name under section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG is also appropriate. The interest of the police officers in not disclosing their family name to a broader public on the occasion of an official activity without the need for any specific reason does not outweigh the public interests pursued by the legislature with the legal provision. In particular, contrary to the submission in the course of the appeal on points of law, the obligation of the officers does not violate their human dignity. The officers are not degraded to mere objects of public action based on section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG. Rather, the name tag makes it possible to address them directly by their name and therefore takes special accounts of the quality of the officers as subjects.

33 The intensity of the interference with the right to informational self-determination is weakened by the fact that the legislature already opened up the possibility of deviating from the general obligation in section 9 (3) BbgPolG. The interests of the officers are also being taken into account by the fact that, according to no. 4.3 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht, the civil servant himself or herself decides on the exception if the supervisor who would normally be responsible for this decision cannot be reached.

34 The weight of the interference with the police officer's right to informational self-determination is relatively low since only the family name of the officer is concerned. Furthermore, the officer is aware of both the disclosure of the personal data and the purpose of this measure. The assumption that police officers could be subjected to unfounded accusations has not yet been confirmed. There can be no objection to the fact that the legislature attributes a higher value to the public interest it has formulated in publicly accessible and transparent work of the police and to the aspect of improvement in the ability to detect illegal conduct of office holders as well as the prevention of such breaches than to the right of the police officer to informational self-determination.

35 d) The provision of section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG does not breach article 3 (1) GG.

36 Under section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG, only police officers in uniform are covered by the obligation to wear a name tag. A uniform only refers to clothing that due to its uniform design identifies the officer concerned as an office holder and makes his or her function recognisable to the outside (police uniform). The differentiated treatment of police officers in uniform and other officers of the police not in uniform (officers employed in the administrative area of the police, e.g. in personnel or finance matters or with the criminal police) is justified given that these generally do not have permanent direct contact with citizens. It is specifically the strengthening of transparency of the work of the police in direct contact with the citizens that is one of the aims of the legal identification obligation.

37 It is also objectively justified that the provision of section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG does not apply to uniformed police officers of the Federation and of other federal states who are deployed in the federal state of Brandenburg. The federal state of Brandenburg may only regulate the obligation to wear a certain uniform or a name tag by law for those officers who are in a service relationship with the federal state. If civil servants of the Federation or another federal state become active in the territory of the defendant, their official activity is governed by section 77 BbgPolG. However, in these cases the defendant does not acquire the competence to regulate the service-law related circumstances of these police officers.

38 The exception of certain groups of police officers from the obligation to wear the name tag (no. 4.2 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht) is objectively justified. Such exemption relates to officers who have no direct contact with citizens or do not wear a uniform and to cases where there exists an overriding public interest in the officers not being recognised and known as members of the police. Seconded police officers may wear uniform and headgear on their way to and from their place of work. However, such police officers cannot be included in the identification obligation under section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG since they do not perform any official act then.

39 Nor is the defendant subject to a special obligation to justify, which is why, unlike the Federation or the majority of the other federal states, it provided for the identification obligation of police officers by law. The respective legislature decides on this politically controversial issue based on an independent weighting of the aspects speaking in favour of and against such identification.

40 e) Finally, section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG does not violate the duty of care as a traditional principle within the meaning of article 33 (5) GG.

41 The general duty of care requires the employer to protect the civil servant against unjustified accusations as well as to take the best interests of the civil servant adequately into account (BVerfG, decision of 15 December 1976 - 2 BvR 841/73 - BVerfGE 43, 154 <165>). Making use of the decision-making power to which it is entitled, the legislature of the federal state of Brandenburg has balanced the interests of the police officers and the public interests to be defined by it - the legislature - in such a way that the police officers generally have to wear a name tag but are exempt from this obligation in accordance with section 9 (3) BbgPolG under certain circumstances. This legislative decision does not lead to any unreasonable disadvantages for the individual police officer. The permissible legislative decision cannot be called into question relying on the general duty of care.

42 2. The obligation for police officers, such as the claimant, resulting from section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG, to wear an identification allowing subsequent identification on their uniform instead of the name tag in the case of separate unit operations, is constitutional as well.

43 With regard to the legislative power of the defendant, reference may be made to the statements concerning section 9 (2) first sentence BbgPolG. The obligation under section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG interferes with the right of the claimant to informational self-determination as well (a). However, this interference is based on a legal provision that also fulfils the requirements of the principle of proportionality (b).

44 a) Section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG interferes with the scope of protection of the right of police officers wearing uniform to informational self-determination.

45 The scope of protection of the right to informational self-determination is not limited to information that already by its nature is of a sensitive type and must be protected for this reason alone as a basic right. The handling of personal data of even only marginal informational value may have a constitutionally relevant impact on the privacy and freedom of conduct of the person concerned (BVerfG, decision of 18 December 2018 - 1 BvR 142/15 - (...) para. 37 et seqq.). All information that may contain information about the person they relate to falls within the scope of protection; there is no such thing as insignificant data (BVerfG, judgment of 11 March 2008 - 1 BvR 2074/05, 1 BvR 1254/07 - BVerfGE 120, 378 <399>).

46 This means that the identification the officer must wear in the case of separate unit operations also falls under personal data. The alias is assigned to a certain police officer, can be decrypted based on the allocation made by the employer to a specific officer, and therefore contains information about the person it refers to. Based on this fixed allocation of the identification, criminal or disciplinary investigations can be instituted against the bearer of the identification if accusations related to a separate unit operation are made against the latter.

47 b) Section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG meets the constitutional requirements for justification of interference with the right to informational self-determination.

48 What is required is a legal authorisation that determines occasion, purpose and limits of the interference in a precise and legally clear manner specifically for the relevant area (BVerfG, judgment of 24 November 2010 - 1 BvF 2/05 - BVerfGE 128, 1 <47>). It must be clear from the legal authorisation who the person concerned is, for what specific purposes his or her personal data are intended and required, and that their use remains limited to this purpose (BVerfG, judgment of 15 December 1983 - 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83 - BVerfGE 65, 1 <62 et seq.>). Certain general requirements concerning transparency, the protection of individual rights, control, purpose limitation and deletion of data result from the principle of proportionality. The objective of these is to ensure that the use of personal data remains limited to the purposes that justified the data processing, and that the use is no longer possible once these have been achieved or settled (BVerfG, judgment of 20 April 2016 - 1 BvR 966, 1140/09 - BVerfGE 141, 220 para. 144 with further references).

49 aa) article 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG provides the necessary legal basis since the Act alone - and not merely a simple administrative regulation - obligates the police officer to wear an identification that allows his or her identity to be determined subsequently instead of a name tag when being deployed in a separate unit.

50 bb) In the case of the identification, the legal purpose of the promotion of transparency and public accessibility of the work of the police becomes of secondary importance. The legitimate purpose of the legal authorisation in the sense of the principle of proportionality is primarily to ensure that it is possible to detect any criminal offences and not inconsiderable breaches of official duties committed by individual police officers within the framework of operations of separate police units. At the same time the identification obligation serves the purpose of compliance by the administration with existing legislation by preventing illegal conduct of individual officers of the police during an operation in a separate unit. Furthermore, the possibility of being identified ensures that the majority of police officers acting lawfully are spared from the outset from being included in specific investigations. Finally, it becomes easier to enforce recourse claims against delinquent police officers.

51 The legal identification obligation also takes account of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) relating to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the case of the deployment of masked and unidentified police officers (ECtHR, judgment of 9 November 2017 - Application no. 47274/15 - Hentschel and Stark, (...)). The European Court of Human Rights reiterates that police officers wearing masks should be required to visibly display some distinctive insignia, such as a warrant number. Otherwise the difficulties resulting from the deployment of police officers without any individually identifying insignia in attributing identification to a specific civil servant would have to be compensated for by corresponding intensive efforts aimed at investigating the accusation of abuses in the context of the police operation.

52 cc) The obligation to wear identification that allows the purpose of the Act to be achieved is also necessary.

53 The employer has different options as to how to identify police officers. The employer may, as is the case in Berlin for instance (Rules of Procedure for the Central Service Unit (ZSE, Zentrale Serviceeinheit) no. 2/2009 of the Chief of Police in Berlin of 26 November 2010), permanently allocate several official numbers to one officer. It is equally conceivable to reallocate the official number for each police operation and to delete this allocation again once the operation is over (section 12 (4) and (5) of the Act on the Public Security and Order of the Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt (SOG LSA, Gesetz über die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt) in the version of 2 August 2019 <Law and Ordinance Gazette for the Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt (GVBl. LSA, Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt für das Land Sachsen-Anhalt) p. 218, 234> in conjunction with section 3 of the Ordinance on the Identification Obligation for Subsequent Identification of Police Officers of the Federal State of Saxony-Anhalt (Verordnung über die Kennzeichnungspflicht zur nachträglichen Identifizierung von Polizeibeamten des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt) of 28 April 2018 <GVBl. LSA p. 43>). The employer may, however, also allocate the identification permanently, as in section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG.

54 Each of these options causes different ways of interference with the right of the officer to informational self-determination. In the case of the regulation applicable in Berlin, several official numbers have to be stored. The regulation according to section 12 (4) SOG LSA makes it necessary to store the allocation again for each operation in a separate unit. Such frequent storage processes have the inherent risk that wrong entries may be made. Based on the legislature's assessment prerogative concerning the choice of the procedure, there can, from the point of view of necessity, be no objection to the fact that the legislature of the federal state of Brandenburg decided to opt for a generally permanent allocation of the identification. Furthermore, the obligation under section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG is moderated by the possibility of changing the identification assigned at any time. If the officer finds himself or herself facing the risk of hostilities due to the identification allocated to him or her, he or she can apply for the identification to be replaced once, or even on a regular basis, in accordance with no. 4.6.2 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht.

55 dd) The obligation to wear the identification in the case of a separate unit operation under section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG is also appropriate.

56 (1) The purpose duly pursued by the legislature with the identification obligation is not out of proportion to the inherent weight of the interference with the right to informational self-determination of the police officer associated with it.

57 The intensity of the interference is relatively low since the collection is apparent and the identification, as opposed to the name tag, does not allow an onlooker to draw an immediate conclusion concerning the person behind it. Only the department managing personnel is allowed to make the allocation. Access to the file requires a personal identifier and must be verifiable (no. 4.6.1 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht). On the other side, there is the important public interest in ensuring that criminal offences or not inconsiderable breaches of official duties committed by individual members of separate units within the framework of police operations can be detected. If an office holder commits a criminal offence or a not inconsiderable breach of an official duty while performing his or her official duties the trust in the integrity of public action is significantly impaired. It has to be ensured accordingly that it is possible to effectively investigate the office holder even if it is also usually difficult to identify him or her as a member of a separate unit due to his or her equipment. The possibility of attributing illegal conduct to a specific police officer also prevents such conduct and thereby increases legal compliance of the work of the police.

58 The allocation of an identification to a specific police officer for the duration of his or her assignment to a separate unit of the police of the federal state of Brandenburg is designed in an appropriate and reasonable manner by making it possible to exchange this identification once, or on a regular basis, for operational reasons but also for the police officer's own protection (no. 4.6.2 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht).

59 (2) Even if a legal provision, such as section 12 (4) SOG LSA, complies with the requirements of, for example, determining the purpose of data collection and the deletion of the data by law better than the provision which is the subject of the dispute here, section 9 (2) BbgPolG in conjunction with the provisions of data protection law of the federal state of Brandenburg that need to be taken into account additionally meets the further requirements of the principle of proportionality in the narrow sense of the term (see on this issue, BVerfG, decision of 18 December 2018 - 1 BvR 142/15 - (...) para. 101 and 153 et seqq.).

60 The primary purpose of the identification obligation under section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG is, as presented, to guarantee and facilitate the detection of criminal offences and not inconsiderable breaches of official duties by members of separate units within the framework of a police operation; at the same time this provision prevents possible illegal conduct of individual police officers. Accordingly, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation (OJ L 119 p. 1) - GDPR), which was directly applicable in the Member States from 25 May 2018, is not decisive here. The matter instead falls within the scope of application of Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA (OJ L 119 p. 89) which has to be distinguished from the General Data Protection Regulation.

61 This is evident from the provision of article 2 (2) (d) of the GDPR, taking recital 19 of the GDPR into account. According to this provision, the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. Directive (EU) 2016/680 contains precisely this provision, as can be derived from its article 1 (1). In its recitals 10 et seq., Directive (EU) 2016/680 contains the specific rules on the protection of natural persons when processing their personal data in the areas stated. In principle, the Directive refers to activities of the police and other prosecuting authorities directed at the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences. In accordance with recital 12 of the Directive, this also includes police activities without prior knowledge if an incident is a criminal offence or not. Such activities can also include the exercise of authority by taking coercive measures such as police activities at demonstrations, major sporting events and riots. It has to be generally noted that the relevant concepts, such as the "prevention of threats" and "criminal offence" must be autonomously interpreted (see recital 13 of Directive (EU) 2016/680).

62 Concerning the connection with criminal offences (including just potential ones), measures of the Member State falling within the scope of criminal prosecution prevention - such as the storage of the identification data under section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG here - also fall under the scope of application of Directive (EU) 2016/680. They largely serve to attribute illegal conduct of police officers, especially in the case of mass events, such as demonstrations, sporting events, in particular football matches, or riots, to a specific police officer so that such conduct can then be punished under criminal or disciplinary law, and thereby at the same time prevent such conduct.

63 The Senate may declare this without the need to refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under article 267 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) since the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt, and the existence of such a possibility must be assessed in the light of the specific characteristics of EU law, the particular difficulties to which its interpretation gives rise and the risk of divergences in judicial decisions within the European Union (CJEU, judgment of 4 October 2018 - C-416/17 European Commission/French Republic - (...) para. 110).

64 The link between the identification and the respective police officer contained in the password-protected file represents personal data as defined in article 3 (1) of Directive (EU) 2016/680.

65 The Federal Data Protection Act (BDSG, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz) in the version of the Data Protection Adjustment and Transposition Act EU (Datenschutz-Anpassungs- und -Umsetzungsgesetz EU) of 30 June 2017 (Federal Law Gazette (BGBl., Bundesgesetzblatt) I 2097) may not be used as a legislative decision to transpose the Directive into national law, since this Act does not contain provisions relating to the procession of personal data relevant here. Section 1 (1) no. 2 BDSG does also cover the activity of public bodies of the federal states; however, this only applies if they act in the capacity of judicial bodies in matters other than administrative ones, but this is not the case here.

66 In order to transpose Directive (EU) 2016/680, the defendant federal state has adopted two Acts; on the one hand, the Data Protection Act of the Federal State of Brandenburg (BbgDSG, Brandenburgisches Datenschutzgesetz) of 8 May 2018 (GVBl. I no. 7, p. 1) in the version of the Act of 19 June 2019 (GVBl. I no. 43, p. 2) and, on the other hand, the Act on the Transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/680 for the Processing of Personal Data by the Police as well as in Law Enforcement and Forensic Psychiatric Detention of the Federal State of Brandenburg of 19 June 2019 (BbgPJMDSG, Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/680 für die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten durch die Polizei sowie den Justiz- und Maßregelvollzug des Landes Brandenburg) (GVBl. I no. 43, p. 2). This Act is relevant for the storage of identification data within the meaning of section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG by the police since it especially and comprehensively regulates the processing of personal data by the police (Brandenburg Parliament, draft act of the federal state government, Landtag printed paper (LT-Drs., Landtagsdrucksache) 6/10692, explanatory memorandum on section 1, p. 5 et seqq.) and because the provision of this Act takes priority over the provisions of the other - general - Act (Brandenburg Parliament, draft act of the federal state government, LT-Drs. 6/7365, explanatory memorandum on section 1 (2), p. 2).

67 The term "police" within the meaning of section 1 (1) no. 1 BbgPJMDSG refers to all public bodies of the Brandenburg police, as far as they process personal data for repressive or preventative police purposes (Brandenburg Parliament, draft act of the federal state government, LT-Drs. 6/10692, explanatory memorandum on section 1, p. 7). This includes departments managing personnel that have the task to assign and manage the five-digit identifiers (no. 4.6.1 VV Kennzeichnungspflicht).

68 (a) The police officers are involved in the allocation of the identifiers by the employer in accordance with section 6 (1) BbgPJMDSG. The officers are aware that the employer stores this - open - allocation. The use of the data becomes transparent because if investigations are initiated based on a corresponding indication of misconduct of someone wearing an identification, the officer concerned must be made aware of this in order to protect his or her rights in the investigation proceedings. It is also possible to review the lawfulness of the use of the data in these proceedings. The transmission of personal data and the grounds for the transfer must be documented (section 13 (1) second sentence BbgPJMDSG).

69 Section 40 (1) BbgPJMDSG grants the officer a comprehensive right of access corresponding to that in article 14 of Directive (EU) 2016/680 according to which the officer may also request information about the recipients of the personal data.

70 (b) Section 3 no. 2 BbgPJMDSG codifies the principle of purpose limitation as laid down in article 4 (1) (b) of Directive (EU) 2016/680. According to this article, personal data may only be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not be processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes.

71 It is evident from section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG that only data that are absolutely necessary for an identification that allows subsequent determination of the identity of the individual police officer may be stored based on this authorisation. Based on the wording of the legal provision and the legislative materials, such personal data may only be used if there is sufficient factual evidence for the assumption that a member of a separate unit committed a criminal offence or a not inconsiderable breach of an official duty in the course of the operation of a separate unit and it is not possible, or only possible using significant efforts, to identify the offender in another way. According to section 13 (2) first sentence BbgPJMDSG, the recipient may only process the personal data transmitted to him or her for this specific purpose.

72 (c) Section 15 (1) BbgPJMDSG transposes article 16 (2) in conjunction with article 4 (1) (e) of Directive (EU) 2016/680 into federal state law and codifies the general obligation of the controller to delete personal data ex officio in cases where the purpose of processing the data is achieved. Section 15 (2) BbgPJMDSG serves to transpose article 5 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, which requires appropriate time limits to be established for the deletion of personal data or for a periodic review of the need for the storage of personal data. Transposition is based on section 37 second to fourth sentence BbgPolG (Brandenburg Parliament, draft act of the federal state government, LT-Drs. 6/10692, explanatory memorandum on section 15, p. 18).

73 According to this, the respective personal data must be erased as soon as a police officer no longer uses an identification or once the data are no longer necessary for the original purpose for which they were collected, namely determining the identity of the police officer. Before deletion there must be a waiting period starting from the last deployment of the officer using this identification; this period is calculated from the time that usually passes, based on previous experience, between an operation and the receipt of a specific complaint.

74 (3) If, contrary to the statements under para. 60 et seqq., the identification obligation under section 9 (2) second sentence BbgPolG is not allocated to the scope of application of Directive (EU) 2016/680, but to the scope of application of the GDPR, the result with regard to the other general requirements of the principle of proportionality is the same. In this case, the legal obligations result from the directly applicable Regulation (e.g. article 5 (1) (b), article 6 (1) (e), article 12 (1), article 15 (1) and article 17 (1) (a) GDPR).