The claimant, a limited liability company (GmbH, Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) in liquidation, seeks the deletion of a painting from an internet database operated at www.lostart.de. This database, inter alia, includes search requests and found-object reports on cultural objects of which Jewish owners were deprived as a result of persecution under the Nazi regime and on cultural objects for which such a history of loss cannot be ruled out because of gaps in their provenance. The database was established on the basis of an agreement concluded by and between the Federation and the federal states by the Magdeburg Coordination Office, a dependent working group at the Ministry of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerium) of the defendant federal state.

In 2005, the Coordination Office received a search request for the painting on behalf of the community of heirs of Rosa and Jakob O. on the grounds that all company shares in the claimant had been bequeathed to the Jewish couple Mr. and Mrs. O. in 1929. The claimant was said to have been deprived of the painting in 1935 through an auction held in the context of Nazi persecution. Another search request was made in 2009 by members of communities of heirs - who have meanwhile passed away and whose heirs are the present third parties summoned to attend the proceedings as parties whose rights may be affected (hereinafter "summoned third parties") - who succeeded to the estates of the Jewish shareholders of the former J. S. bank. The request was made on the grounds that in 1933 the painting had been transferred to the bank as security before the bank acquired it at an auction in 1935. Subsequently, the bank's Jewish shareholders lost it in 1938 in the course of the bank's so-called "Aryanisation". Due to the competing search requests, the internet database lists the painting without specifying any names.

Meanwhile the painting has been found in Namibia. In early 2010 the person in possession of the painting, the claimant and the members of the community of heirs of Mr. and Mrs. O. agreed to have the painting auctioned at Sotheby’s in Amsterdam in May 2010 and to equally share the proceeds between the person in possession of the painting and the community of heirs of Mr. and Mrs. O. The auction failed after the Coordination Office refused to delete the search request in the absence of the consent of the second applicants.

By judgment of 17 January 2012 the Administrative Court ordered the defendant to delete the search entry for the painting from the Lost Art Internet Database. By judgment of 23 October 2013, the Higher Administrative Court rejected the appeals on points of fact and law filed by the defendant and the summoned third parties. The reasons stated were essentially that the claimant had a right to have persisting unlawful consequences arising out of an act of the executive eliminated (Folgenbeseitigungsanspruch; hereinafter: remedial action) against the defendant, entitling the claimant to demand deletion of the search request. The lawfulness of the entry was said to be governed by the standards developed for the area of - non-regulatory - government information dissemination. The Court was of the opinion that the question of whether or not statutory authorisation was needed for the operation of the database could be left open. The continued publication of the search request was said to be unlawful in any case, as its purpose had already been achieved. The documents forming the basis for the establishment of the Coordination Office were said to show that the function of the database was limited to publishing search requests and found-object reports that referred to cultural assets covered by the Washington Principles and the Joint Declaration by the Federal Government and the federal states of 1999. This purpose was said to have been achieved when the painting was found.

Against this decision, the defendant and the summoned third parties lodged an appeal on points of law.

9 The appeals on points of law brought by the defendant and the summoned third parties are well-founded. By rejecting their appeals on points of fact and law, the court of appeal violated federal law (section 137 (1) no. 1 of the Code of Administrative Court Procedure (VwGO, Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung). Although the court of appeal was ultimately correct to assume that the legal dispute was for the administrative courts to decide (1.). The action is admissible in other respects as well (2.). However, the action is without merit (3.). The court of appeal confirmed a claim to remedial action on grounds that are incompatible with federal law. Its assumption that the purpose of the search request made by the legal predecessors of the summoned third parties, among others, was achieved when the painting was found relies on too narrow a factual basis and is incorrect (3.1). The continued publication of the search request is not (objectively) unlawful for other reasons either (3.2). Therefore, no violation of the claimant's rights has occurred (3.3).

10 (…)

11 1. Contrary to the view held by the defendant, jurisdiction lies with the administrative courts (1.1), and the dispute does not generally lie outside of the scope of judicial review (1.2).

12 1.1 With regard to the admissibility of the chosen path for seeking legal redress, the court responsible for deciding upon legal remedies against a ruling on the substance of the matter does not, in accordance with section 17a (5) of the Courts Constitution Act (GVG, Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) review whether the action brought is admissible with respect to the jurisdiction of the court. However, this prohibition to review does not apply if the court of first instance acted contrary to section 17a (3) second sentence GVG by failing to make an advance decision on the admissibility regarding the jurisdiction of the court even though an objection had been raised (established jurisprudence, cf. Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG, Bundesverwaltungsgericht), decision of 28 January 1994 - 7 B 198.93 ( …); Federal Court of Justice (BGH, Bundesgerichtshof), decision of 23 September 1992 - I ZB 3/92 - Rulings of the Federal Court of Justice in Civil Matters (BGHZ, Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen) 119, 246 <250>; Federal Labour Court (BAG, Bundesarbeitsgericht), judgment of 21 August 1996 - 5 AZR 1011/94 (…); Federal Finance Court (BFH, Bundesfinanzhof), decision of 24 June 2014 - X B 216/13 – (…)).

13 Applying this provision, the court of appeal was precluded from reviewing the question of jurisdiction of administrative courts. (…)

14 1.2 The request for deletion is not directed against a sovereign act that is free from the jurisdiction of the courts and therefore, by its nature, generally lies outside the scope of judicial review. The review of this question is not subject to the prohibition stipulated in section 17a (5) GVG because the question is not which court has jurisdiction; rather, the question is whether or not the dispute lies outside of any form of judicial review.

15 As part of the executive the Coordination Office - like any other public body - is bound by law, and in particular by basic rights (art. 1 (3), art. 20 (3) GG), and its actions are subject to review by the courts (art. 19 (4) first sentence GG). In line therewith, citizens have the right to be protected against acts of public authorities as effectively as possible to the extent that such acts interfere with their rights (established jurisprudence, cf. BVerfG, judgment of 18 July 2005 - 2 BvR 2236/04 – Rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfGE, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts) 113, 273 <310> with further references). Apart from a few narrowly defined exceptions (cf., e.g., art. 10 (2) second sentence and art. 44 (4) GG), as a rule the Basic Law does not provide for any government acts to be generally exempt from such judicial review. This means that contrary to the opinion held by the defendant, legal protection also has to be granted against acts directing the state (staatsleitende Akte), if and to the extent to which they affect an individual’s subjective rights under public law (subjektiv-öffentliche Rechte). The question as to which intensity of scrutiny must be applied to the judicial review of such acts is another issue.

16 (…)

17 2. The action is admissible in all other respects as well, in particular the subsequent liquidator that acts on behalf of the claimant is entitled to conduct the proceedings (2.1), and the claimant does not lack the required legitimate interest in taking legal action (2.2).

18 2.1 The request for deletion lies within the scope of the subsequent liquidator’s powers of representation. (…)

19 (…)

20 2.2 The claimant does not lack the required legitimate interest in taking legal action either. This means that the court must not refuse to grant legal protection unless there is no conceivable aspect indicating the existence of an interest deserving of legal recognition in obtaining the judicial ruling being sought. The standard to be applied in this context must be strict (...).

21 The court of appeal was right to assume that, in view of the factual and legal difficulties associated with the question of ownership, taking action against the summoned third parties before the civil courts would not be a clearly preferable alternative for the claimant. Moreover, any such legal dispute would not necessarily have to be conducted before a German court. However, pursuant to the principles set up by the Coordination Office, only a ruling by a domestic court can give rise to the right to claim deletion.

22 (…)

23 3. The action is without merit, however. The factor relevant for assessing whether or not the action for performance is well founded is the factual and legal situation at the time of the last oral hearing before the court of appeal. (…)

24 The court of appeal rightly assumed that the only possible basis for a claim for the requested deletion is a general claim to remedial action. This claim arises in cases in which sovereign intervention that infringes an individual’s subjective rights has brought about an unlawful situation that still persists. Claims of this kind are not limited to cases in which an unlawful administrative act was prematurely performed; they can also be asserted against unlawful encroachment of any kind, even where such results from simple action on the part of the administration (physical act, Realakt). The claim to remedial action aims at the restitution of a lawful situation; the remedial action is to rectify all unlawful consequences that can be attributed to the public authority acting which resulted from that authority’s official acts (BVerwG, judgments of 25 August 1971 - 4 C 23.69 (…); of 19 July 1984 - 3 C 81.82 - Rulings of the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwGE, Entscheidungen des Bundesverwaltungsgerichts) 69, 366 <370 et seqq.>; and of 23 May 1989 - 7 C 2.87 - BVerwGE 82, 76 <95> with further references).

25 A further review on points of law of the claim awarded by the court of appeal is not precluded by the fact that the Coordination Office forms part of a public authority of a federal state and as such generally executes the law of that federal state. As the claim to remedial action is a rule of law derived from the Basic Law, among others - in particular from the basic rights affected in a specific case and from the rule of law principle - remedial action as a principle and a claim forms part of federal law and is therefore also open to further review on points of law pursuant to section 137 (1) no. 1 VwGO (BVerwG, judgment of 25 August 1971 - 4 C 23.69 (…)).

26 Contrary to the opinion held by the court of appeal, the preconditions for a general claim to remedial action directed towards the deletion of the search request are not fulfilled. It is correct to regard the continued publication of the search request on the part of the Coordination Office as an administrative action under public law (3.1). However, it does not result in an unlawful situation (3.2). Therefore, no violation of the claimant's own rights has occurred (3.3).

27 3.1 The registration and deletion of search requests and found-object reports on cultural assets published on the www.lostart.de website by the Magdeburg Coordination Office forms part of government actions to disseminate information in connection with the performance of public tasks. It is irrelevant that no liability is assumed for the accuracy of search requests and found-object reports submitted by third parties, for entries are exclusively made according to the Coordination Office’s own principles which it set up itself. In line with these principles, before any entry is made in the list, a plausibility check is performed that especially extends to the information provided by the applicant regarding the object concerned, the history of its loss and the applicant's own person. Likewise, the way in which competing requests or reports are treated and the deletion of requests or reports are governed by the Coordination Office’s own rules, are set up by the Office itself. The Lost Art Internet Database is therefore not merely a platform that was freely made available to the general public and for whose content no state liability is assumed.

28 3.2 The failure to delete the search request has not, however, resulted in an unlawful situation. The internet database operated by the Coordination Office is a public institution in a non-technical sense of the term, made available to the general public within the framework set by its designated purpose. The actions of the Coordination Office can therefore only be reviewed by the courts to establish whether (a) they comply with that designated purpose and (b) are compatible with superior law, in particular basic rights.

29 a) The continued publication of the search request lies within the scope of the database’s designated purpose. In compliance therewith, the purpose of a search request accepted by the Coordination Office on the grounds of suspected looted art will not already have been achieved when the sought cultural object is found if the ultimate fate of said object remains uncertain. The contrary assumption of the court of appeal, namely that the purpose of the search list is only to support the persons affected in their search for missing looted art, is based on too narrow a factual basis and thus insufficient to meet the requirements that apply to the formation of judicial conviction. Pursuant to section 108 (1) first sentence VwGO, the court is obliged to take the overall outcome of the proceedings into consideration when forming its free conviction. Therefore, it must not proceed in such a way that fails to take note of or to consider individual significant facts or evidence. This requirement is not met if a court proceeds on the basis of an incorrect or incomplete factual background, in particular if it ignores circumstances whose relevance to the ruling should have become evident to it. Such cases lack a sustainable basis for the court's internal formation of a judicial conviction and at the same time also for the court to review its ruling to see whether it oversteps the boundaries delimiting an assessment that is objectively free from arbitrary decisions and takes due account of the laws of nature and the rules of logic (Natur- und Denkgesetze) as well as of the rules gained from general experience (allgemeine Erfahrungssätze). The question of whether or not the factual basis upon which the court made its ruling was too narrow is a question of assessing facts and evidence, which must generally be seen as a question of substantive law (BVerwG, judgment of 5 July 1994 - 9 C 158.94 - BVerwGE 96, 200 <210 et seqq.> with further references).

30 The court of appeal was basically right to assume that as a result of the absence of statutory stipulations to determine the purpose of the search list contained in the database, reference had to be made to the declarations of intent made on this topic by the governmental bodies in charge of the institution (...). In this context it referred to the Federation-Federal States Agreement dated 15 September 2009, among other things, which underlies the establishment of the Coordination Office. The Agreement in turn made reference to the “Principles with Respect to Nazi-Confiscated Art” adopted at the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets on 3 December 1998 (Washington Principles). Without providing any further explanation, the court of appeal concluded from the documents it consulted that the purpose of the search request had been achieved when the painting was found (...). In drawing this conclusion, the Court overlooked the fact that the designated purpose is not solely dependent on the statements made by the responsible governmental bodies when the Coordination Office was set up. This is because it is also possible for the designated purpose to be extended by subsequent declarations of intent. In determining the purpose, the court of appeal should therefore also have taken into consideration the principles governing the registration and deletion of search requests and found-objects reports that were adopted by the Coordination Office with the consent of its responsible governmental bodies.

31 Since the content of the declarations of intent relevant for determining the designated purpose is undisputed in the present case, the Senate may interpret and evaluate these declarations itself without having to refer the matter back to the court of appeal for further clarification. An interpretation based on the true intention (cf. section 133 of the Civil Code (BGB, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) shows that the purpose of a search request registered on the grounds of suspected looted art will not already have been achieved when the sought cultural object is found. According to the Federation- Federal States Agreement of 2009, the tasks incumbent upon the Coordination Office include, among other things, the documentation of domestic and foreign search requests and found-object reports that relate to cultural assets lost because of Nazi persecution, and their presentation at www.lostart.de. This does not imply that the publication of search requests is to be limited to cultural assets whose location is unknown to the persons searching for them. Such a limitation would indeed also be incompatible with the historical responsibility expressly emphasised in the preamble in the form of the consent to the 1998 Washington Principles. In accordance with these Principles, it is not merely a matter of identifying works of art that were confiscated by the Nazis and not subsequently restituted (no. 1); much rather, the pre-war owners and their heirs should be “encouraged to come forward and make known their claims” (no. 7) and receive support in their efforts “to achieve a just and fair solution” (no. 8). The deletion of search requests after a work has been found but before the person currently in possession of the work as well as - possibly competing - pre-war owners and their heirs have reached either an agreement on the work’s further fate, or at least a binding clarification of the question of ownership, would run counter to these Principles. This is also confirmed by the principles for registering and deleting search requests and found-object reports adopted by the Coordination Office with the consent of its responsible governmental bodies, which further flesh out the designated purpose of the database. According to these principles, a search request or found-object report can only be deleted if the deletion has been requested by the applicant, the plausibility of the request has been called into fundamental doubt, or the deletion has been requested by a third party once their legal ownership has been established by a legally effective judgment of a German court of law. The concept behind these grounds for the deletion of a search request or found-object report also implies that the purpose will not already have been achieved when the sought cultural object is found if the ultimate fate of said object remains uncertain. No decision needs to be made on the question of whether or not the database serves any more comprehensive purposes that go above and beyond the aforementioned.

32 If the purpose of the search list is not limited to locating the whereabouts of cultural assets confiscated as a result of Nazi persecution but also covers the publication of search requests so as to encourage the parties concerned to achieve an amicable solution, then, contrary to the assumption made by the court of appeal, the purpose of the search request in dispute has not yet been achieved in the present case, irrespective of whether or not the summoned third parties have had sufficient opportunity to secure any potential claims. Neither can the purpose be seen to have been achieved because the person in possession of the painting, the claimant and the members of the community of heirs of Mr. and Mrs. O. agreed on the economic exploitation of the painting as this agreement was reached without involving the summoned third parties. (…)

33 b) The continued publication of the search request is also compatible with superior law. In the absence of statutory stipulations, it should be reviewed in the case in hand whether or not basic rights in particular have been violated.

34 With a view to the actual sales difficulties associated with a search request, the only basic rights that might possibly be affected are freedom of occupation (art. 12 (1) GG) and general freedom of action (art. 2 (1) GG). Article 14 (1) GG does not apply if only because the scope of protection afforded by the constitutional guarantee of property is not affected by the publication (cf. BVerfG, decision of 26 June 2002 - 1 BvR 558/91 inter alia - BVerfGE 105, 252 <277 et seq.>). The same applies to the right to informational self-determination derived from art. 2 (1) in conjunction with art. 1 (1) GG (cf. BVerfG, judgment of 15 December 1983 - 1 BvR 209/83 inter alia - BVerfGE 65, 1 <41 et seqq.>), as, due to the competing search requests, the Coordination Office did not publish any personal data in the present case. No decision needs to be made on the question of whether art. 2 (1) GG or art. 12 (1) GG should be applied to the claimant’s situation as a more specific provision, because for the persons whose economic interests were negatively affected by the continued publication of the search request – this action did not lead to an interference with either art. 2 (1) GG or art. 12 (1) GG that would require a specific statutory enactment.

35 The court of appeal was right to assume that reference has to be made to the principles developed by the Federal Constitutional Court with regard to violations of basic rights caused by government actions to disseminate information in order to decide upon the question of compatibility with superior law. Pursuant to these principles, not every instance of information dissemination by the government and not every instance of government participation in the process of shaping public opinion must be regarded as an interference with basic rights (BVerfG, decision of 24 May 2005 - 1 BvR 1072/01 - BVerfGE 113, 63 <76>). Even if a curtailment of basic rights due to dissemination of information by the government does not meet the criteria defining an interference in the classic sense of the term, especially since it is not based on any direct regulatory effect (BVerfG, chamber decision of 17 August 2010 - 1 BvR 2585/06 (…)), dissemination of information by the government can indeed lead to an indirect factual interference with basic rights (BVerfG, chamber decisions of 12 August 2002 - 1 BvR 1044/93 (…) and of 16 August 2001 - 1 BvR 1241/97 (…)). However, the provision of market-related information on the part of the government does not interfere with the scope of protection afforded by art. 12 (1) of the GG, provided the influence on factors relevant under competition law takes place without distorting the market situation and in accordance with the legal requirements for information dissemination by the government. In line therewith, the dissemination of information by the government presupposes a task incumbent on the acting body as well as adherence to the limits of competence. In addition, the requirements as to the accuracy and the objective nature of the information must be observed, and the intention and actual effects of government actions to disseminate information must not be such as to constitute a substitute for a government measure that would have to be classified as an interference with basic rights (BVerfG, decision of 26 June 2002 - 1 BvR 558/91 inter alia - BVerfGE 105, 252 <268 et seqq.>). As derived from the power to direct the state (Staatsleitung), the government also has the authority to disseminate information in the non-commercial sector, provided that the government's information-related actions remain within the scope of competence to disseminate information, and that the persons affected do not suffer any disproportionate encroachment upon their basic rights (BVerfG, decision of 26 June 2002 - 1 BvR 670/91 - BVerfGE 105, 279 <301>). Provided these preconditions are fulfilled, the actions to disseminate information are deemed to be covered by the government’s performance of tasks even if they go hand in hand with an indirect factual interference with basic rights. This is because the allocation of a task in principle entitles to disseminate information in connection with performing this task even if it is possible that such could cause incidents of indirect factual interference with basic rights. In such an event the principle of the requirement of the enactment of a specific statute (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes) does not call for any special authorisation by the legislator above and beyond this scope (BVerfG, decision of 26 June 2002 - 1 BvR 670/91 - BVerfGE 105, 279 <303>).

36 aa) The Coordination Office's activities pursue a governmental task. This task is based on the Federation-Federal States Agreement of 2009. The search request remains part of the task of documentation and information assigned to the Coordination Office under said Agreement. In the field of information, the authority for government actions also results from the publicity work function attributable to the role of directing the state. It also includes the dissemination of information for the purpose of informing the general public about important matters and enabling citizens to play an independent part in helping to cope with problems (BVerfG, decisions of 26 June 2002 - 1 BvR 558/91 inter alia - BVerfGE 105, 252 <268 et seqq.> and - 1 BvR 670/91 - BVerfGE 105, 279 <302>). In view of Germany’s historical responsibility, society as a whole has an interest in the publication of information about cultural assets suspected to be looted art as a means of enabling interested citizens to participate in addressing as yet unresolved unlawful consequences of the Nazi regime. There is no need to decide upon the question of whether or not, in addition to that, the publication of loss events that have been finally settled would also be covered by the government’s authority to disseminate information.

37 bb) The dissemination of information by the Coordination Office does not violate the federal system of division of powers (cf. BVerfG, decision of 26 June 2002 - 1 BvR 670/91 - BVerfGE 105, 279 <308>). (…)

38 cc) The publication in dispute is neither unobjective nor incorrect. In this respect the question of substantive accuracy does not depend on whether the painting was actually lost to the legal predecessors of the summoned third parties due to Nazi persecution. This is because the publication of search requests in the Lost Art Internet Database is restricted to documentation of requests submitted by third parties, which the operator merely subjects to a rough plausibility assessment. The substantive accuracy of a suspicion of looted art raised in a search request submitted by a third party is therefore not a matter about which the government is disseminating information. Apart from cases of evident inaccuracy, it is therefore not relevant whether the facts upon which a loss report is based are correct or whether the applicant drew proper legal conclusions from these facts. The aim of the database is not to recognise and/or assign restitution claims. The publication of search requests and found-object reports simply intends to bring the pre-war owners and/or their heirs together with those currently in possession of the objects and to support them in achieving a just and fair solution.

39 dd) Equally, there are no other reasons for which the continued publication of the search request could have a disproportionate impact on the persons whose economic interests are negatively affected thereby, or on their basic rights. The purpose pursued by the continued publication in supporting the summoned third parties, who have asserted the plausible claim that the painting was lost to their legal predecessors as a result of Nazi persecution, until the ownership question and any potential claims to restitution have been settled with finality, is legitimate, bearing in mind Germany’s historical responsibility, its approval of the Washington Principles and the efforts to actually implement these principles with the help of the Lost Art Internet Database. The continued publication of the search request up until such final settlement is reached is a suitable and necessary means of achieving this purpose. In particular, there is no obvious other way in which the purpose of the database could have been achieved by means of a less burdensome yet equally effective form of government information. Finally, it is equally not unreasonable since the parties involved have the possibility of settling the matter with final effect, if necessary by taking recourse to the civil courts.

40 ee) Moreover, the lack of a statutory basis does not render the continued publication of the search request unlawful either. Irrespective of the question of the authorisation of government bodies to disseminate information, the scope of protection afforded by basic rights affected thereby is encroached upon if the actions are not limited to the publication of information that can serve as a basis for users of the government source of information to make self-determined decisions in line with their own interests. More specifically, the dissemination of information on the part of the government is capable of encroaching on the scope of protection afforded by the basic rights involved if its intention and effects constitute a substitute for a government measure that would have to be classified as an encroachment upon basic rights in the classic sense of the term. The special binding requirements of the legal system - including the requirement for a statutory basis - cannot be circumvented by choosing such a functional equivalent of an encroachment. Rather, in such events the relevant legal requirements that apply to an encroachment upon basic rights must be met (BVerfG, decisions of 26 June 2002 - 1 BvR 558/91 inter alia - BVerfGE 105, 252 <273> and - 1 BvR 670/91 - BVerfGE 105, 279 <303>).

41 In this sense the continued publication of the search request does not represent a functional equivalent for a (targeted) encroachment upon basic rights. The information contained in the request is limited to documenting that a third party has lodged a suspicion of the painting being a work of looted art. Based on this piece of information, database users can make self-determined decisions that serve their own interests, e.g., in their capacity as persons in possession of a painting they can decide upon whether or not they are willing to return the painting voluntarily or to cooperate in reaching another solution, or in their capacity as auctioneers or potential buyers they can decide on whether or not they wish to accept the painting for sale at auction or to acquire it at auction despite the existing suspicion and the associated risks. In contrast, the search request has no effects whatsoever on the assignment of ownership, the power to dispose of the painting, or the existence of any potential restitution claims. If disputed, these questions must be settled among the parties concerned by taking recourse to the civil courts. It is primarily the history of loss asserted by the summoned third parties that might affect the painting's market value and saleability. The “stigma” resulting therefrom is merely made public by the continued publication of the request in the search list. This stigma would not disappear by deleting the request from the list, and the summoned third parties could also continue to pursue their claim in other ways, including ways that would attract public attention. (…)

42 The so-called “essential matters doctrine” (Wesentlichkeitstheorie) of the Federal Constitutional Court put forward by the claimant does not furnish proof of the necessity of a statutory basis either. In line with this theory, the rule of law principle and the principle of democracy require that the legislator makes all material decisions itself rather than leave them to the executive. As far as areas with relevance to basic rights are concerned, the question of whether or not a measure is essential and thus has to be reserved for parliament itself to decide, or is at least one that can only be adopted on the basis of strictly defined powers granted by parliament, is a question that, as a rule, depends on its essential matter for the implementation of basic rights (BVerfG, decision of 21 December 1977 - 1 BvL 1/75 inter alia - BVerfGE 47, 46 <79> with further references). To this extent the rulings of the Federal Constitutional Court that relate to the constitutional requirements for admissible government actions to disseminate information show that no statutory basis is needed, even if the aspect of the “essential matter doctrine” is taken into consideration, provided the requirements established in those rulings are complied with. (…)

43 3.3 If, in view of the above, the continued publication of the search request is objectively lawful, then it also means that no violation of the claimant’s rights has occurred, which would be a prerequisite for the claimant to have a valid claim to remedial action under public law. (…)

44 (…)